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Compromising Liberty for National Security:
The Need To Rein in the Executive's Use
of the State-Secrets Privilege in
Post-September 11 Litigation
STEPHANIE
I.

A.

FICHERA*

INTRODUCTION

The War on Terror has been plagued by charges of unitary executive misconduct and defiance of our nation's laws and constitutional values. Troubling cases have surfaced from the War on Terror in which
U.S. citizens and foreign nationals alike have sought relief for wrongs
allegedly suffered at the hands of the federal government, including
claims of unlawful detention, prisoner abuse, and unwarranted surveillance. Many of these cases involve executive assertions of the statesecrets privilege-a doctrine powerful enough to cause the outright dismissal of an entire lawsuit at the government's behest. The state-secrets
privilege is a common-law evidentiary privilege that enables the Executive to shield from disclosure information purportedly containing state
or military secrets on the basis that the disclosure of such information
would jeopardize national security.' The consequences of a successful
assertion of the privilege are assumed primarily by private litigants-in
addition to the American public as a whole-because the privilege
often results in the dismissal of a plaintiff's case and allows the government to avoid meddlesome litigation, embarrassing disclosure of information, and accountability for wrongdoing. Moreover, a court-approved
invocation of the state-secrets privilege imposes another substantial cost:
it compromises civil liberties, rights of individual litigants, and fundamental constitutional values in favor of a promised enhancement of
national security.
This note focuses on two recent cases, El-Masri v. United States2
* J.D. Candidate 2008, University of Miami School of Law; B.A. 2005, Boston University.

The author wishes to thank Professor Stephen Vladeck for his invaluable guidance in the
development of this article and her family and friends for their support.
1. See, e.g., Hepting v. AT&T Corp. (Hepting II), 439 F. Supp. 2d 974, 980 (N.D. Cal.
2006); Meredith Fuchs, Judging Secrets: The Role Courts Should Play in Preventing Unnecessary
Secrecy, 58 ADMiN. L. REv. 131, 134 (2006).
2. El-Masri v. United States (EI-Masri II), 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S.
Ct. 373 (2007); El-Masri v. Tenet (El-Masri 1), 437 F. Supp. 2d 530 (E.D. Va. 2006).
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and Hepting v. AT&T Corp.,3 which respectively depict two troublesome
products of the Bush administration's execution of the War on Terror:
(1) extraordinary rendition programs and (2) warrantless, secret surveillance. El-Masri involved allegations of unlawful detention and mistreatment of a prisoner in accordance with a Central Intelligence Agency
("CIA") program; the entire case was dismissed on the basis of the statesecrets privilege.4 Hepting considered an action brought by customers
against AT&T for its alleged participation in the Executive's warrantless
surveillance program.' In Hepting, however, the court denied the govemnment's motion to dismiss on the grounds of the privilege and suggested special procedural precautions for handling classified material
during discovery. 6 As such, these cases will be used to analyze the
executive branch's assertion of the state-secrets privilege in controversial War on Terror-related cases and the varying responses of the federal courts.7
Furthermore, Hepting and El-Masri are indicative of the flaws
inherent in the state-secrets privilege, including its penchant for slamming the courthouse door on potentially injured individuals, preventing
executive accountability, and hedging public debate on contentious, but
important issues. The Hepting and El-Masri decisions also show lower
federal courts approaching the state-secrets privilege with different
understandings of the scope and extent of executive power, the role of
the courts, and the privilege itself. Finally, the circumstances and outcomes of the Hepting and El-Masri cases shed light on the dangers the
state-secrets privilege and unchecked executive power pose to individual
rights and liberties.
This note contends that in the legal and political context surrounding cases like Hepting and El-Masri, the successful assertion of the
state-secrets privilege can lead to dangerous, counter-constitutional
results and should therefore be considered with heightened judicial scru3. Hepting II, 439 F. Supp. 2d 974; Hepting v. AT&T Corp. (Hepting I), No. C-06-672
VRW, 2006 WL 1581965 (N.D. Cal. June 6, 2006).
4. See El-Masri H, 479 F.3d at 300; EI-Masri 1, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 540-41.
5. See Hepting II, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 978.
6. See id. at 980, 1010-11.
7. This note focuses on two cases, one dealing with extraordinary rendition and the other
with warrantless surveillance, in an attempt to analyze the character and effect of the state-secrets
privilege in recent War on Terror-related litigation. Federal courts have considered the privilege
in a number of other cases involving similar issues stemming from the War on Terror. See, e.g.,
Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1 (2005); In re Nat'l Sec. Agency Telecomms. Records Litig., 483 F.
Supp. 2d 934 (N.D. Cal. 2007); Doe v. CIA, No. 05 Civ. 7939 LTSFM, 2007 WL 30099
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 2007); AI-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 451 F. Supp. 2d 1215 (D. Or.
2006), rev'd, 507 F.3d 1190 (9th Cir. 2007); ACLU v. NSA, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754 (E.D. Mich.
2006), vacated, 493 F.3d 644 (6th Cir. 2007), petition for cert. filed, Oct. 3, 2007 (No. 07-468);
Terkel v. AT&T Corp., 441 F. Supp. 2d 899 (N.D. I11.2006).
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tiny. The very danger inherent in the state-secrets privilege lies in the
fact that it can be used by the government to conceal illegal and unconstitutional activity, thereby limiting access to courts, undermining
notions of separation of powers and checks and balances, and preventing
public debate and official accountability. Thus, in light of the political
controversy surrounding and questionable constitutionality of the government's warrantless surveillance and extraordinary rendition programs, federal courts should approach the invocation of the privilege
critically and with limited deference. In a system of separated powers,
checks and balances, and open government, the courts should serve as
an outlet for citizens and foreign nationals alike to air their grievances
and possibly obtain redress when they have suffered allegedly unconstitutional treatment at the hands of another branch of government. This
note, therefore, will argue that the approaches taken by the Northern
District of California in the Hepting case and by the D.C. Circuit in a
1989 case entitled In re United States8 offer a fair, reasoned, and balanced path for future courts to follow when considering claims of the
state-secrets privilege. Hepting and In re United States serve as examples of how the federal courts can, within the bounds of precedent,
address the government's invocation of the state-secrets privilege critically in light of the special context surrounding post-September 11 litigation, thereby preventing the privilege from being used as a means of
concealing unconstitutional executive behavior.
In sum, this note seeks to analyze the government's use of the statesecrets privilege in recent cases arising out of the War on Terror as a
means of forestalling litigation, withholding information, and preventing
governmental liability, and thus, chipping away at structural and theoretical constitutional protections-protections designed to defend individual rights and liberties and to prevent executive overreaching. Part II
provides a brief overview of the nature and development of the modern
state-secrets privilege, including an examination of the problematic 1953
U.S. Supreme Court decision 9 that set the stage for the modern-day privilege. Part III reviews the outcomes of the EI-Masri and Hepting cases
and discusses the courts' respective approaches to the state-secrets privilege. Part IV addresses the problems inherent in the state-secrets privilege in light of its application to cases arising out of the War on Terror.
Finally, Part V argues that courts should follow the line of Hepting and
In re United States, which seek to nondeferentially consider public, private, and governmental interests and invoke procedural safeguards to
protect national security during litigation when secrecy is deemed genu8. 872 F.2d 472 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
9. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
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inely necessary-an approach that is preferable to simply affording the
Executive an absolute privilege.
II.

THE MODERN-DAY STATE-SECRETS PRIVILEGE

In the legal battles that have emerged since September 11 and the
inception of the War on Terror, the state-secrets privilege has been
employed by the Executive as a means of forestalling litigation, criti-

cism, and public debate regarding the policies made and actions taken in

an effort to respond to the international problem of terrorism. 10 Such
successful assertions of the privilege negatively affect fundamental constitutional rights and principles. A brief look at the foundation, elements, and nature of the state-secrets privilege will shed light on the
problems underlying its invocation in warrantless surveillance and
extraordinary rendition cases.
The state-secrets privilege is a common-law evidentiary privilege
that permits the government to withhold information from discovery
when disclosure threatens to harm national security or expose military
affairs." The modern state-secrets privilege 12 was first pronounced in
10. There is some debate among scholars regarding the Bush administration's reliance on the
state-secrets privilege in comparison to that of previous Presidents. Meredith Fuchs contends that
not only has governmental secrecy generally increased since September 11, but the state-secrets
privilege has been used more frequently as a "litigation tactic" as well. See Fuchs, supra note 1, at
133-35. As of September 2005, Fuchs reported that
[i]n the 23-year span between the Supreme Court case that authorized the use of the
state secrets privilege in 1953 and 1976, the government litigated cases involving
the privilege four times. In the 24 years between 1977 and 2001, courts were called
to rule on the government's invocation of the privilege 51 times. In the three and
one-half years since then, at least six district courts and seven courts of appeals have
produced written opinions concerning the privilege. This represents an increase
from less than once every five years to twice a year to more than three times a year.
Id. at 134-35 (footnotes omitted). In addition, the government has called upon the state-secrets
privilege in a number of other cases since the publication of Fuchs's article. See, e.g., cases cited
supra note 7.
Robert M. Chesney, however, disagrees, arguing that the state-secrets privilege-though an
important instrument in defending post-September 11 cases-has not been used by the Bush
administration with great frequency. See Robert M. Chesney, State Secrets and the Limits of
National Security Litigation, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1249, 1301 (2007) [hereinafter Chesney,
State Secrets]. Chesney addresses the issue in detail, also finding that, in terms of the nature of
information, judicial review, and requested relief involved in state-secrets cases, the privilege has
been employed in substantially the same fashion. Id. at 1301-08. Similarly, in an amicus brief to
the Ninth Circuit in the pending appeal of the Hepting case, Professor Chesney argued for reversal
and contended that the government's assertion of the state-secrets privilege was in line with the
privilege's historical scope and use. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Professor Robert M. Chesney in
Support of Reversal at 2, Hepting v. AT&T Corp., Nos. 06-17132, 06-17137 (9th Cir. Mar. 19,
2007), 2007 WL 1231995.
11. See, e.g., Hepting 11, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 980; Fuchs, supra note 1, at 134.
12. This paper principally focuses on the nature and consequences of the modern state-secrets
privilege. A number of recent works provide in-depth treatment of the historical origins and
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the 1953 Supreme Court case, United States v. Reynolds. 3 Reynolds
involved suits brought against the United States by the widows of three
civilians killed in the crash of a B-29 aircraft.' 4 The widows, suing

under the Federal Tort Claims Act, sought production of the Air Force's
official investigation report as well as statements made by surviving
crew members during the investigation.' 5 The Secretary of the Air
Force, however, filed a formal claim of privilege, asserting that production of the documents would not be in the "public interest" because the
aircraft was engaged in a "highly secret" Air Force mission at the time
of the accident. 6 The information, the government claimed, "could not
be furnished 'without seriously hampering national security, flying
safety and the development of highly technical and secret military
equipment.' "'
The Supreme Court, reversing both lower federal courts,1 8 accepted
the government's story and held that the filing of a formal claim of privilege by the Secretary of the Air Force and the indication of a "reasonabie possibility that nulitary secrets were involved" secured the
government a privilege to refuse production of the documents requested
by the plaintiffs." The Reynolds Court thus laid the foundation for the
modern-day state-secrets privilege as a privilege that "belongs to the
[g]overnment"2 ° and characterized by a high level of deference to executive judgment and an emphasis on the primacy of national security.
Reynolds required that there be "a formal claim of privilege, lodged by
development of the privilege. See, e.g., Louis
UNCHECKED PRESIDENTIAL

POWER AND

THE

FISHER, IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL

Reynolds

CASE

SECURITY:

212-52 (2006); Chesney, State

Secrets, supra note 10, at 1270-1308; Jared Perkins, Comment, The State Secrets Privilege and
the Abdication of Oversight, 21 BYU J. PUB. L. 235, 238-45 (2007).
13. 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
14. Id.at 2-3.
15. Id.at 3.
16. Id.at 4.
17. Id.at 5.
18. See id.at 5, 12. The district court had ordered the government to produce the requested
documents for review to determine whether they contained privileged information. Id.at 5. The
government refused, and the district court ultimately entered final judgment for the plaintiffs. Id.
The court of appeals affirmed. Id. See generally FISHER, supra note 12, at 29-91 (2006)
(providing an extensive treatment of the Reynolds case at the district and circuit court levels).
19. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 5, 10-11.
20. Id. at 7. Moreover, the government has the right to assert the privilege whether or not it is
a party to the case. In re United States, 872 F.2d 472, 475 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (citing Fitzgerald v.
Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 776 F.2d 1236 (4th Cir. 1985); Farnsworth Cannon, Inc. v. Grimes, 635 F.2d
268 (4th Cir. 1980) (en banc)). Note, for example, that the United States intervened as a
defendant in the Hepting case and proceeded to move for dismissal or summary judgment on the
basis of the state-secrets privilege. Hepting H, 439 F. Supp. 2d 974, 979 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
AT&T, a private corporation, was unable to employ the state-secrets privilege in its defense and
instead moved to dismiss the case on issues of standing, affirmative pleading requirements, and
statutory, common-law, and qualified immunity. Id.
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the head of the department which has control over the matter, after

actual personal consideration by that officer. 12 1 Yet, the Court outlined
no mechanism for determining whether what the government claimed
secret was indeed a secret. In fact, the Reynolds Court tolerated a

remarkably minimal showing on behalf of the government. Rather than
supporting its decision with independent analysis of the government's
claims of secrecy, the Court essentially based its decision on an assump-

tion: "On the record before the trial court it appearedthat this accident
occurred to a military plane . . . [testing] secret electronic equipment.

Certainly there was a reasonable danger that the accident investigation
report would contain references to the secret electronic equipment
.... "22 And while the Court proposed that the privilege was "not to be
lightly invoked," 23 it eschewed the idea of conducting in camera review
of the government's evidence.24
Finally, the state-secrets privilege has come to hold severe consequences: "Once successfully invoked, the effect of the privilege is completely to remove the evidence from the case."25 Moreover, a successful
invocation of the privilege can result in the dismissal of a plaintiffs
entire case.2 6 Reynolds has, therefore, resulted in the government often

being afforded an absolute privilege, effectively ending the lawsuit and
denying the plaintiff his day in court at the behest of the Executive.2 7
21. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 7-8 (footnote omitted).
22. Id. at 10 (emphasis added).
23. Id. at 7.
24. The Reynolds Court instructed that "[tihe court itself must determine whether the
circumstances are appropriate for the claim of privilege, and yet do so without forcing a disclosure
of the very thing the privilege is designed to protect." Id. at 8 (footnote omitted). The Court
further stated that
[i]t
may be possible to satisfy the court, from all the circumstances of the case, that
there is a reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose military
matters which, in the interest of national security, should not be divulged. When
this is the case, the occasion for the privilege is appropriate, and the court should not
jeopardize the security which the privilege is meant to protect by insisting upon an
examination of the evidence, even by the judge alone, in chambers.
Id. at 10.
25. In re United States, 872 F.2d at 476 (citing Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51, 65 (D.C.
Cir. 1983)).
26. Id. ("If the information is essential to establishing plaintiffs prima facie case, dismissal is
appropriate."); see also Kasza v. Browner, 133 F.3d 1159, 1166 (9th Cir. 1998) (discussing when
and how the state-secrets privilege could provoke the dismissal of a case). The Kasza court stated
that a case could be dismissed in three situations: (1) if the plaintiff cannot prove the prima facie
elements of the claim without privileged evidence; (2) if the defendant cannot put forth a valid
defense to the claim without privileged evidence; or, (3) if the "very subject matter of the action"
is a state secret. Id. at 1166 (quoting Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 11 n.26).
27. See Ellsberg, 709 F.2d at 57 ("When properly invoked, the state-secrets privilege is
absolute."); see also Halkin v. Helms (Halkin 11),
690 F.2d 977, 990 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (contending
that Reynolds establishes that state secrets are absolutely privileged from disclosure in courts);
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Yet, as Louis Fisher has made clear, the Reynolds decision arguably
rests on a shaky legal foundation for it was essentially based on misrepresentations made by the government to the Court.28 In 2000, the
daughter of one of the victims of the B-29 crash was able to review the
declassified accident report on the Internet. 29 As it turned out, the docu-

ment contained no vital governmental secrets and no references to secret
military equipment, but merely the names of the individuals who had
been at fault in the accident.3" Despite the government's representations
to the courts during the original Reynolds litigation, production of the
documents to the widows posed no risk that secret information would be
revealed and that the nation would subsequently be exposed to security

threats. 3'
Accordingly, it is problematic that nearly sixty years after Reynolds, a harsh and absolute privilege that was established by a case
founded on governmental misrepresentations continues to play a significant role in present legal disputes. In light of its uneasy history, it is not
surprising that Fisher views the state-secrets privilege as unnecessary,
contrary to notions of private rights and fair judicial procedure, and supportive of arbitrary executive power. 32 Thus, the combination of a privilege that fosters arbitrary executive power with the recent surveillance
and prisoner abuse cases-cases in which the privilege has been raised
with troubling results-is dangerous, not only in terms of judicial procedure and private rights, but in terms of structural constitutional protections that define our system of government as well.
Halkin v. Helms (Halkin 1), 598 F.2d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (declaring that the state-secrets
privilege is absolute).
28. See FISHER, supra note 12, at 3. Fisher has further charged that the Supreme Court
"unwisely" embraced the state-secrets privilege "without any independent analysis." Id. at 17.
Fisher wrote, for example, that
[a]t the level of the Supreme Court ... the justices accepted what the government
alleged about the accident report and the survivor statements, without ever making
an independent inspection of the materials. Not only did that undermine the case
brought by the widows, it also signaled that the Court functioned as part of the
executive branch rather than as an independent institution.
Id. at 28.
29. Id. at 165-68.
30. See id. at 166, 256.
31. See id. at 255. After discovering the accident report, the survivors of the victims of the B29 crash returned to the Supreme Court, requesting that it vacate the 1953 Reynolds decision and
reinstate the original district court judgment in the plaintiffs' favor. Id. at 176, 181. The Supreme
Court twice refused to review the case. Id. at 188, 211. For an in-depth discussion of the
discovery of the accident report and the extensive legal campaign that ensued, see id. at 165-211.
32. Id. at 253. Fisher also contends that Reynolds resulted in the enlargement of executive
power in military and foreign affairs, arguing that the case sent "an ominous signal that in matters
of national security, the judiciary is willing to fold its tent and join the executive branch." Id. at
253, 257.
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Ill. Two CASE STUDIES
Although a number of cases raising similar issues involving the
War on Terror and the state-secrets privilege have come to the courts in
recent years,3 3 this note focuses on the EI-Masri and Hepting cases,
which respectively encompass two realities of the post-September 11
world: extraordinary rendition and warrantless surveillance. As Robert
M. Chesney explains,
the privilege has the capacity to prevent courts from engaging the
most significant constitutional issue underlying the post-9/11 legal
debate: whether and to what extent recognition of an armed conflict
with al Qaeda permits the executive branch to act at variance with the
framework of laws that otherwise restrain its conduct.34

These cases prove useful in analyzing the state-secrets privilege in this
context because they offer two approaches to the privilege and illustrate
two possible outcomes of litigation in which the privilege is invoked by
the Executive. Moreover, Hepting and El-Masri espouse different
understandings of the role of the federal courts in the face of the privilege and of the balance between constitutional rights and liberties and
governmental secrecy and national security.
A.

The El-Masri Case and ExtraordinaryRendition

In El-Masri v. Tenet,35 the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia considered the case of a German citizen of Lebanese
descent who asserted that he was a victim of the United States'
"extraordinary rendition" program.36 Extraordinary rendition is an intelligence-gathering scheme that purportedly has been used in conjunction
with the War on Terror. Apparently, the program involves the secret
abduction and transfer of suspects to other countries-countries that use
torture and forms of interrogation widely considered unacceptable in the
United States-to obtain information.37 In its opinion, the court detailed
El-Masri's allegations and paints a disturbing picture of his experience.38 El-Masri claimed that he was wrongfully abducted while
attempting to cross the border between Serbia and Macedonia and subse33. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 7.
34. Chesney, State Secrets, supra note 10, at 1269.
35. 437 F. Supp. 2d 530 (E.D. Va. 2006).
36. Id. at 532.
37. See David Weissbrodt & Amy Berquist, Extraordinary Rendition: A Human Rights
Analysis, 19 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 123, 125 (2006); see also Chesney, State Secrets, supra note 10,
at 1257-58.
38. See El-Masri I, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 532-34. For a more thorough treatment of El-Masri's
story, see Chesney, State Secrets, supra note 10, at 1255-63.
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quently imprisoned.39 While imprisoned, he was allegedly deprived of
the opportunity to contact a lawyer, his wife, a translator, or the German
government.4° During extensive interrogations, El-Masri consistently
denied any association with al Qaeda.4 1 El-Masri also recounted
instances where his captors-among other things-allegedly stripped
him of his clothing, beat him, sodomized him with a foreign object,
dressed him in a diaper, and injected him with sedatives.42 El-Masri
insisted that the detention, questioning, and abuse he endured was the
work of CIA agents and private corporations involved in the program,
acting pursuant to unlawful CIA policies.43 El-Masri finally contended
that former CIA Director, George Tenet, and Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, were aware that his detention was the result of mistaken
identity one or two months before his release.' By the time El-Masri
made his way back to Germany, he discovered that his wife and children
had returned to Lebanon under the impression that they had been
abandoned.45
El-Masri proceeded to bring a civil suit against Tenet, ten unknown
CIA agents, three private corporations, and ten unknown private
employees, stating three causes of action: a Bivens claim, a claim under
the Alien Tort Statute ("ATS") for violations of international principles
proscribing arbitrary detention, and another claim under the ATS for
violating international legal norms prohibiting cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment.46 The United States intervened in the case and
moved for summary judgment, arguing that allowing the suit to continue
to discovery would result in the disclosure of state secrets.4 7
The Eastern District of Virginia embraced a deferential and absolutist approach to the government's assertion of the state-secrets privilege,
which it described as "a privilege of the highest dignity and significance." 48 Moreover, the court took a clear stance in favor of frank exec39. El-Masri 1, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 532.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 533.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 532-34.
44. Id. at 534.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 534-35.
47. Id. at 535. Interestingly, an article in the New York Times contended that there was
"substantial evidence" that El-Masri was indeed "subjected to the C.I.A.'s practice of
extraordinary rendition," stating that "a report issued by the Council of Europe concluded that Mr.
Masri's account of having been abducted and mistreated was substantially accurate." Adam
Liptak, U.S. Appeals Court Upholds Dismissal of Abuse Suit Against C.LA., Saying Secrets Are at

Risk, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2007, at Al. Moreover, the article noted that a German court has issued
arrest warrants for thirteen people believed to be involved in the matter. Id.
48. EI-Masri 1, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 536. In a recent article, Cass R. Sunstein considered
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utive privilege in wartime:
In times of war, our country, chiefly through the Executive Branch,
must often take exceptional steps to thwart the enemy. Of course,
reasonable and patriotic Americans are still free to disagree about the
propriety and efficacy of those exceptional steps. But what this decision holds is that these steps are not proper grist for the judicial mill
where, as here, state secrets are at the center of the suit and the privilege is validly invoked.4 9

The El-Masri court did not reach the merits, but instead dismissed the
entire suit on the basis of the state-secrets privilege, stating that "ElMasri's private interests must give way to the national interest in preserving state secrets." 5 0 To evaluate the government's claim of privilege
regarding the purportedly secret "operational details of the extraordinary
rendition program,"5 the court adopted the following test: "If a court
finds that the state secrets privilege has been validly asserted, it must
then determine whether the case must be dismissed to prevent public
disclosure of those secrets, or whether special procedural mechanisms
may be adequate to prevent disclosure of the state secrets. 52 The court
decided that the United States validly asserted the state-secrets privilege 53 and that El-Masri's case could not be fairly litigated without risking the disclosure of details about the extraordinary rendition programthat is, El-Masri would have to prove that he was abducted, detained,
and mistreated as a result of a government-sanctioned program. 4 Thus,
El-Masri's case could not be litigated at all, leaving him without hope
for a remedy from the judicial branch.55 The opinion, however, is arguably short for such troubling allegations of governmental misconduct, and
the court failed to make a vigorous effort to determine whether the information that the government claimed was "secret" truly deserved
protection.
positions adopted by federal courts in deciding conflicts between national security and freedom.
Cass R. Sunstein, National Security, Liberty, and the D.C. Circuit, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 693
(2005). Sunstein termed one such position "National Security Fundamentalism" and argued that
National Security Fundamentalists understand the Constitution to call for a highly
deferential role for the judiciary, above all on the ground that when national security
is threatened, the president must be permitted to do what needs to be done to protect
the country. For National Security Fundamentalists, courts should adopt a strong
presumption in favor of allowing the president to do as he wishes. If the president
cannot safeguard the nation's security, who will?
Id. at 693. The El-Masri court's posture arguably falls into this category.
49. El-Masri 1, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 540-41.
50. Id. at 539.
51. Id. at 538.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 539.
55. Id. at 541.
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On March 2, 2007, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
affirmed the lower court's dismissal of El-Masri's suit, adopting-and
even extending-the deferential approach to the state-secrets privilege
that characterized the Eastern District of Virginia's opinion in the case.5 6
The Fourth Circuit's opinion not only enfeebles federal judicial power,
but also stresses a constitutionalized understanding of the state-secrets
privilege. The court maintained that
[a]lthough the state secrets privilege was developed at common law,
it performs a function of constitutional significance, because it allows
the executive branch to protect information whose secrecy is necessary to its military and foreign-affairs responsibilities. Reynolds itself
suggested that the state secrets doctrine allowed the Court to avoid
the constitutional conflict that might have arisen had the judiciary
demanded that the Executive disclose highly sensitive military
secrets. In United States v. Nixon, the Court further articulated the
doctrine's constitutional dimension, observing that the state secrets
privilege provides exceptionally strong protection because it concerns
areas of Art. II duties [in which] the courts have traditionally shown
the utmost deference to Presidential responsibilities.5 8
Thus, Fourth Circuit jurisprudence affords the executive branch a high
level of deference in the area of foreign affairs and shows little interest
in acting as a check against executive overreaching.5 9 Moreover, the
court twice used the word "obliged" to qualify and justify its decision.60
In doing so, the Fourth Circuit minimized its judicial role and denied
56. See EI-Masri 11, 479 F.3d 296, 302 (4th Cir. 2007). On October 9, 2007, the U.S.
Supreme Court denied E1-Masri's petition for a writ of certiorari challenging dismissal by the
lower courts. E1-Masri v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 373 (2007).
57. See EI-Masri II, 479 F.3d at 303-04. The Fourth Circuit ruled that "[tihe state secrets
privilege that the United States has interposed in this civil proceeding... has a firm foundation in
the Constitution, in addition to its basis in the common law of evidence." Id. at 304. The notion
of a "constitutionalized" state-secrets privilege is dangerous because it indicates an improper
expansion of the common-law privilege. In doing so, it expands executive power at the expense
of judicial and congressional power. A mere "function of constitutional significance" is not
sufficient to warrant destructive and abusive executive power in the context of these cases. Cf.
Brief of Amici Curiae Professor Erwin Chemerinsky et al. in Support of Hepting and Urging
Affirmance at 15, Hepting v. AT&T Corp., Nos. 06-17132, 06-17137 (9th Cit. May 2, 2007),
available at http://www.eff.org/legal/cases/att/chemerinskyamicus.pdf ("[U]nlike executive
privilege, which the Supreme Court has suggested is 'inextricably rooted in the separation of
powers under the Constitution,' United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 708 (1974), the state secrets
privilege is a common-law evidentiary rule that may generally be superseded-and the
applicability of which may be regulated-by statute.").
58. El-Masri I, 479 F.3d at 303 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
59. Id. The court contended that the judiciary had only a limited role as a check on
presidential action in foreign affairs, explaining-without citing any authority-that "the
Executive's constitutional authority is at its broadest in the realm of military and foreign affairs."
Id.
60. See id. at 304-06.
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responsibility for the unjust outcome of El-Masri's case, 61 one that left

an individual without access to U.S. courts and without a channel of
reparation for injuries allegedly committed by members of the federal
government.
B.

The Hepting Case and Warrantless Surveillance

The Northern District of California has taken a different approach
and has attempted to lessen the effect of the state-secrets privilege without stretching the bounds of precedent. Hepting v. AT&T Corp.6 2 was

decided by the Northern District of California a few months after ElMasri I. The Hepting court, however, made a notably more searching
and less deferential inquiry than the El-Masri court into the govern-

ment's assertion of the state-secrets privilege regarding a warrantless
surveillance program-equally problematic allegations that go to the
heart of American constitutional values. In Hepting, customers brought

suit against AT&T, arguing that it participated in a warrantless surveillance program orchestrated by the National Security Agency ("NSA"). 63
The plaintiffs contended that the program "illegally tracks the domestic
and foreign communications and communications records of millions of
Americans '' 64 and violates the First and Fourth Amendments in addition
to a number of federal and state statutes.65
Accordingly, the United States intervened and moved to dismiss the

suit on the basis of the state-secrets privilege.66 The Northern District of
61. The court wrote that "[a] court is obliged to honor the Executive's assertion of the
privilege if it is satisfied, from all the circumstances of the case, that there is a reasonable danger
that compulsion of the evidence will expose military matters, which in the interest of the national
security, should not be divulged." Id. at 305 (internal quotation marks omitted). It also stated that
"[iln such a situation, a court is obliged to accept the executive branch's claim of privilege without
further demand." Id. at 306.
62. 439 F. Supp. 2d 974 (N.D. Cal. 2006). The Hepting case is presently on appeal to the
Ninth Circuit. See Hepting v. AT&T Corp., No. 06-CV-672 (9th Cir. filed Nov. 8, 2006). Oral
argument was heard in the case on August 15, 2007. See id. In its brief to the Ninth Circuit,
appellant AT&T argued that the complaint should have been dismissed because the plaintiffs
lacked standing and because the state-secrets privilege would prevent full and fair litigation of the
issue. Brief of Appellant AT&T Corp. at 26-30, Hepting v. AT&T Corp., No. 06-17132 (9th Cir.
Mar. 9, 2007), 2007 WL 1119749.
63. Hepting 11, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 978.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 978-79. The alleged statutory violations committed by AT&T in its collaboration
in the NSA surveillance program include the following: Section 109 of Title I of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978; Section 802 of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968; Section 705 of Title VII of the Communications Act of 1934; Section
201 of Title II of the ECPA ("Stored Communications Act"); Section 201 of the Stored
Communications Act, as amended by section 212 of Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act; and
California's Unfair Competition Law. Id.
66. Id. at 979; see also Hepting I, No. C-06-672 VRW, 2006 WL 1581965, at *1 (N.D. Cal.
June 6, 2006).
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California first issued an opinion in the Hepting case on June 6, 2006, in
which it primarily addressed the state-secrets privilege issue.6 7 The
court held that in order to determine whether and to what extent the
state-secrets privilege applied, it was necessary to review certain classified documents.6 8 While the court adopted a fair and respectful

approach to the government's often-legitimate need for secrecy, it also
sought to balance competing interests and gave the impression that it
was intent on seeing the case proceed. As such, the court ordered that
the government provide the classified documents for review in camera
by the judge. 69 The court explained the reasoning underlying its deci-

sion to balance competing interests:
The court is mindful of the extraordinary due process consequences
of applying the privilege the government here asserts. The court is
also mindful of the government's claim of exceptionally grave damage to the national security of the United States that failure to apply
the privilege could cause. At this point, review of the classified documents affords the only prudent way to balance these important
interests.7°
Unlike the courts weighing in on the El-Masri case, the Hepting court

did not shy away from analyzing the government's appeal for secrecy
and claim of national security risks. It successfully fulfilled its duty to

act as a check against executive power by reviewing the documents that
the government claimed held secrets and posed security threats, explain-

ing that "[a]lthough ex parte, in camera review is extraordinary, this
form of review is the norm when state secrets are at issue."7 1
The Northern District of California revisited the Hepting case on

July 20, 2006. Declining to dismiss the plaintiffs' case, the district court
undertook an extensive consideration of state-secrets privilege-related
precedent in making its decision72 and addressed two issues: (1)
67. Hepting I, 2006 WL 1581965, at *1.
68. Id.at *1,*3.
69. Id.
at *4.The court stated that "this case cannot proceed and discovery cannot commence
until the court examines the classified documents to assess whether and to what extent the state
secrets privilege applies." Id. at * 1.
70. Id. at *4 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
71. Id. at *3.
72. The court considered the meaning and applicability of various federal cases. See Hepting
I1,
439 F. Supp. 2d 974, 980-84 (N.D. Cal. 2006). The court considered the following cases:
Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1876) (creating a privilege regarding contacts between spies
and the government for espionage services); Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1 (2005) (reaffirming the
Totten rule); United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953) (pronouncing the modem state-secrets
privilege); Halkin v. Helms, 598 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (upholding the invocation of the statesecrets privilege with respect to information sought by plaintiffs claiming to be the victims of
surveillance of foreign communications during the Vietnam War); Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d
51 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (requiring the government in a warrantless electronic surveillance to
adequately disclose its basis for asserting the privilege and advocating judicial procedures to
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"whether the state secrets privilege applies and requires dismissal of this
action or immediate entry of judgment in favor of defendants" 73 and (2)
"whether a piece of information constitutes a 'state secret' [by] determining whether that information action is a 'secret.'-7 The court thus
embarked on a lengthy consideration of whether the information that the
government claimed was secret actually was a secret. Indoing so, the
court relied on information regarding official public disclosures, media
reports, and information leaked to the public as well as on documents
filed under seal with the court to hold that the subject matter of the suit
was not a secret, noting that it did not believe that permitting the case to
75
proceed would create a "reasonable danger" to national security.
It is significant to note that the Northern District of California
demonstrated a noticeably different tone and understanding of its role in
this case than did the Eastern District of Virginia and the Fourth Circuit
in EI-Masri. The Hepting court, for example, stated that
it is important to note that even the state secrets privilege has its
limits. While the court recognizes and respects the executive's constitutional duty to protect the nation from threats, the court also takes
seriously its constitutional duty to adjudicate the disputes that come
before it .... The compromise between liberty and security remains a
difficult one. But dismissing this case at the outset would sacrifice
liberty for no apparent enhancement of security.76
Thus, the Executive was not afforded the same degree of leeway in the
Northern District of California as it was in the Eastern District of Virginia and the Fourth Circuit. The Northern District of California also
seems much more willing to scrutinize executive decisionmakingincluding its claims of secrecy. And, unlike the El-Masri courts, the
court in this case appeared hesitant to leave the plaintiffs without a judicial remedy, noting that "no case dismissed because of its 'very subject
matter' was a state secret involving ongoing, widespread violations of
individual constitutional rights, as plaintiffs allege here."7 7 It is thus
clear that the Northern District of California was not only concerned
with maintaining judicial integrity and setting limits for the exercise of
the privilege and of executive power, but it was also concerned with the
effect of the privilege on individual constitutional rights.
handle claims of privilege); Kasza v. Browner, 133 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 1998) (dismissing a case
because the "very subject matter" of the plaintiffs action was a state secret); El-Masri 1, 437 F.
Supp. 2d 530 (E.D. Va. 2006) (dismissing the plaintiffs case on the basis of the state-secrets
privilege).
73. Hepting 11,439 F. Supp. 2d at 980.
74. Id. at 986.

75. See id. at 979, 989, 994.
76. Id. at 995.
77. Id. at 993.
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CRITICAL LOOK AT THE STATE-SECRETS

PRIVILEGE IN APPLICATION

In the wake of September 11 and the inception of the War on Terror, the state-secrets privilege has cropped up in a broad range of cases
challenging the policies and actions of the executive branch. The policies formulated by the Bush administration in response to the September
11 terrorist attacks-including arguably illegal warrantless surveillance,
detention, and torture of individuals-are highly controversial and
widely questioned. Extraordinary rendition and warrantless surveillance
implicate vital American constitutional rights, from the First and Fourth
Amendments to due process and notions of liberty. The successful exercise of the state-secrets privilege in these suits also implicates important
structural and theoretical elements of constitutional law, including separation of powers, governmental accountability, checks and balances,
public involvement and debate, and judicial roles and remedies.
Separation of powers7" and checks and balances 79 serve a central
purpose in our constitutional scheme of government. In his concurring
opinion in the 1998 Supreme Court case, Clinton v. City of New York, 8°
Justice Anthony Kennedy considered the relationship between separation of powers and liberty, writing that "[l]iberty is always at stake when
one or more of the branches seek to transgress the separation of pow78. Erwin Chemerinsky explains that "[tihe Constitution is based on a simple version of
shared and separated powers. For almost every major government action, at least two branches of
government should have to be involved." Erwin Chemerinsky, The Assault on the Constitution:
Executive Power and the War on Terrorism, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. Rav. 1, 4 (2006) [hereinafter
Chemerinsky, The Assault on the Constitution]. Professor Chemerinsky also contends that
[t]he key flaw in the Bush administration's approach is that it ignores the basic
framework that two branches of government should be involved in all major
government actions. The Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments require arrests, and
especially detentions, to be approved by the judiciary. The courts must approve
searches, including electronic eavesdropping under the Fourth Amendment. In
addition to these constitutional protections, treaties and statutes also regulate torture.
Government treatment of individuals is not simply a matter of executive
prerogative.
Id. at 19.
79. Chemerinsky has also commented that "the Bush administration rejects the ability of the
courts to review its actions and even of Congress to check its conduct. Its actions and positions
cannot be reconciled with a system based on checks and balances." Id. at 3. He further contends
that "[i]n the past, the Supreme Court has served an essential role in the system of separation of
powers by checking executive power and rejecting presidential actions that usurp the powers of
other branches of government or prevent them from carrying out their constitutional duties." Id. at
17. A number of cases arising out of the War on Terror have passed through the lower federal
courts, raising issues that the U.S. Supreme Court has yet to rule on. Because issues of
extraordinary rendition, illegal electronic surveillance, and the like are so significant in terms of
the interplay of federal executive and judicial power, Chemerinsky's statement can, arguably,
apply to the role of lower federal courts as well.
80. 524 U.S. 417, 449-53 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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ers. ' " Justice Kennedy described liberty as "fundamental" and argued
that "[c]oncentration of power in the hands of a single branch is a threat
to liberty."'8 2 The state-secrets privilege, in many respects, serves to
concentrate power solely in the hands of the executive branch. Allowing
the Executive to claim the state-secrets privilege in controversial litigation addressing extraordinary rendition and warrantless surveillance
allows the Executive to control not only evidence and discovery in the
litigation, but also the possible dismissal of the plaintiff's entire claim,
thus usurping much of the traditional and constitutional role of the judicial branch. Consequently, the Executive is able to forestall public
debate and official accountability;83 commandeer judicial review, remedies, and access to courts; and most significantly, restrict the exercise
and enforcement of individual rights.
The operation of the state-secrets privilege in recent cases arising
out of the War on Terror raises two separation-of-powers concerns: (1)
whether the executive branch can act outside the bounds of the Constitution without reproach; and (2) whether the judicial branch can review
the Executive's claim of evidentiary privilege and decline to afford the
privilege, forcing the Executive to produce information and face possible public responsibility for its policies.84 Both issues come to light in
the cases dealing with extraordinary rendition and warrantless surveil81. Id. at 450.
82. Id.
83. Meredith Fuchs writes that "[iln almost any case involving an intelligence, law
enforcement, or military agency, classified information likely will be involved, and the state
secrets privilege therefore constitutes a potent weapon for government litigators to avoid liability."
Fuchs, supra note 1, at 153. Fuchs also contends that secrecy allows the government to control
public opinion and avoid criticism or embarrassment. Id. at 154-55. The dismissal of the ElMasri case on the basis of the privilege, for example, allowed the government not only to avoid
liability to the plaintiff were his claims found to have merit, but also to conceal these particular
allegations from broad public scrutiny.
84. It has also been argued that the state-secrets privilege-specifically in the context of the
Hepting case-contravenes the doctrine of separation of powers in terms of the relationship
between the Executive and Congress. See Brief of Amici Curiae Professor Erwin Chemerinsky et
al., supra note 57, at 3-21. In the United States' system of shared powers and checks and
balances, Congress-like the judiciary-plays a role in limiting the power of the Executive. The
Chemerinsky brief contends that Congress has sought to place limits on the executive branch's
ability to act in secret, especially in the realm of electronic surveillance:
When it comes to the presidency, the Constitution strikes the balance between
liberty and efficacy differently. Unlike the legislature, the President can act
efficiently and secretly. But the President's use of these capacities is subject to
legislative limits. Absent this constitutional constraint, there would be little to stop
the abuse of Presidential capacities. The President's capacity for secrecy, for
example, can be used (and historically has been used) to cloak activities that work
against the interests and liberties of the people. Boundaries set through the
relatively liberty-enhancing legislative process are a crucial means to protect against
such abuses.
Id. at 18.
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lance of private communications. Professor Chemerinsky discusses the
Bush administration, executive power, and fundamental constitutional
principles in an article published in 2006.85 He explains that
checking executive power was a central goal of the American constitution. The framers of the Constitution feared executive power the
most. Indeed, in their view, endowing virtually all power in a single
individual ... threatened all liberty. Having endured the tyranny of
the King of England, the framers viewed the principle of86separation
of powers as the central guarantee of a just government.
Affording the Executive an absolute privilege that has the power to trigger the full dismissal of an individual's suit raises a number of constitutional problems. For one, it restricts the checking function of the
judiciary and can enable the Executive to act in disregard of the law
without facing any legal consequences. 87 By refusing to extend the
state-secrets privilege to the Executive when appropriate, the courts
ensure that the Executive's conduct will be reviewed and that it will face
litigation and possible liability when an individual brings compelling
allegations of wrongdoing. In doing so, the judiciary maintains itself as
a separate branch of government independent from the will of the Executive. Chemerinsky also argues that "it is the federal courts' role to
restrain and remedy unconstitutional government conduct, and separation of powers is enhanced, not infringed, when the judiciary hears and
decides constitutional cases." 88 In upholding the structural and theoretical protections that underlie the U.S. Constitution, federal courts are able
to protect individual rights by facilitating access to the courts and offering the potential of a judicial remedy when the private interest in litigation and redress outweighs the governmental interest in secrecy and
security.
Professor Chemerinsky touches on similar concerns in his article:
The President, as Commander in Chief, has no power to violate the
Bill of Rights. Indeed, if the President can authorize wiretapping
without a warrant, he could authorize searches of homes without
complying with the Fourth Amendment. Under this reasoning, the
President could suspend freedom of speech or the press as Com85. See Chemerinsky, The Assault on the Constitution, supra note 78.
86. Id. at 16-17 (citation omitted); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (James Madison)
(declaring that "[t]he accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same
hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, selfappointed, or elective, may
justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny").
87. See Chesney, State Secrets, supra note 10, at 1268. Chesney argues that "[a]ssertions of
the privilege may have the immediate effect of curtailing judicial review, and also the indirect
effect of reducing the capacity of both Congress and the voting public to act as a check on the
executive." Id. at 1269.
88. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 34-35 (4th ed. 2003).
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mander in Chief. If presidential power can trump the Fourth Amendment's requirement for a warrant, there is no reason 89why it cannot be
used to override any other constitutional provision.
The general understanding of Chemerinsky's argument can be extended
to the extraordinary rendition program as well. If the executive branch
can authorize or even merely condone the abduction, detention, and torture of noncitizens abroad-in violation of domestic laws and constitutional values in addition to international treaties and legal norms-there
is little reason to believe that such conduct could not be broadened to
include U.S. citizens or aliens present within the United States.
The post-September 11 United States does indeed face much
uncertainty and danger. And, of course, the threat of terrorism poses
new and considerable security threats that the executive branch must
address swiftly, carefully, and securely. Yet many argue that by eroding
liberty and other constitutional values, the Executive fails to make the
nation any safer from terrorism. 90 The controversies created by the
Executive's policies and actions in this realm undermine the United
States' international integrity and credibility. Instead of rallying the
public to fight terrorism and solve international problems in a unified
fashion, constitutionally questionable executive policies divide the public and focus its attention on disagreement and political squabbles.
Moreover, what is temporarily gained by undertaking to protect security
through secrecy and misconduct may not be worth what is forever lost
by eroding constitutional limits on and expectations of the nation's governing regime. As it has been often made clear by members of the U.S.
Supreme Court, the celebrated values and ideals that define the United
States' governmental structure cannot be left by the wayside in times of
war and anxiety. Justice Kennedy has, for example, proclaimed that
"[t]he Constitution's structure requires a stability which transcends the
convenience of the moment." 9 1 And in the words of Justice Breyer:
"The Constitution always matters, perhaps particularly so in times of
emergency. 9 2

89. Chemerinsky, The Assault on the Constitution, supra note 78, at 13.
90. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Professor Erwin Chemerinsky et al., supra note 57, at
27-28 (discussing the potentially negative impact of secrecy on national security); Chemerinsky,
The Assault on the Constitution, supra note 78, at 20 ("[T]here is no reason to believe that the
country has been made any safer by the loss of liberty.").
91. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 449 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
92. Stephen G. Breyer, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Address to the Association of the
Bar of the City of New York: Liberty, Security, and the Courts (Apr. 14, 2003), availableat http://
www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp_04-15-03.html.

2008]

COMPROMISING LIBERTY FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

V.

Two

643

MODELS FOR FuTuRE STATE-SECRETS CASES

The operation of the state-secrets privilege in the context of the
warrantless surveillance and extraordinary rendition cases being litigated
after September I1 threatens the integrity of the structural and theoretical principles that define our system of open, constitutional government.
The state-secrets privilege's shaky, common-law roots in the Reynolds
case-its legacy tarnished by the Supreme Court's reliance upon governmental misrepresentations about secrecy and national security-combined with its modern-day application in cases arising out of September
11 and the War on Terror-cases in which patently unconstitutional
behavior on the part of the government is alleged-reveal its tendency
to clash with central constitutional values and protections. Federal
courts are therefore in need of a realistic way to rein in the privilege
while still having the flexibility to accommodate the government's legitimate and sincere security concerns. Two cases-Hepting v. AT&T
Corp. and In re United States-serve as examples of a better approach
to the state-secrets privilege in the context of War on Terror-related
issues for both cases successfully accommodate the security needs of the
government without comprising the protections of the Constitution.
A.

Hepting v. AT&T Corporation

In Hepting I, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California took the first step in handling the government's claim of privilege with a critical and prudent scrutiny, seeking to verify the propriety
and scope of the government's claim and to balance the parties' competing interests.93 The court first decided that it was necessary that the
judge inspect the classified documents at issue to determine whether and
93. Cf Brief of Amici Curiae Professor Erwin Chemerinsky et al., supra note 57, at 25-26.
Professor Chemerinsky justifies the Hepting court's balancing approach to the state-secrets
privilege as follows:
[A]lthough the case law interpreting the privilege does not empower courts to
balance the competing interests, that does not relieve courts of their independent
authority-and, given the absolute nature of the privilege, responsibility-to
scrutinize governmental claims to the privilege with as much rigor as is possible,
under the circumstances. That is all that Judge Walker did below.
Any less-rigorous standard would risk turning the state secrets privilege into an
automatic shield for unlawful governmental action, an outcome the Supreme Court
pointedly and emphatically rejected in Reynolds.
Id.; see also Brief of Amici Curiae National Security Archive, Project on Government Oversight,
Project on Government Secrecy, Public Citizen, Inc. and the Rutherford Institute in Support of
Affirmance and Hepting and AI-Haramain at 6, Hepting v. AT&T Corp., Nos. 06-17132, 0617137, 06-36083 (9th Cir. May 7, 2007), 2007 WL 1766484 (similarly arguing that the statesecrets privilege requires independent judicial balancing to prevent the privilege from enabling the
government to shield unconstitutional programs from judicial scrutiny).
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to what extent the state-secrets privilege applied.94 The court further
noted that "[a]lthough ex parte, in camera review is extraordinary, this
form of review is the norm when state secrets are at issue. 95 It is significant that the Northern District of California insisted on conducting in
camera review of the purportedly classified documents 96 rather than
accepting the government's claim of privilege and of potential hazard to
national security at face value. The judge is able to provide for judicial
procedures that protect against widespread dissemination of the information (to the public, the press, or terrorists) while conducting the necessary review. In doing so, the judge remains respectful of the
government's often-legitimate need for secrecy for purposes of military
affairs and national security while also remaining mindful of the government's policy-driven motives for fabrication. This approach allows the
court to weed out dishonest or misrepresented claims of executive privilege, while still having the leeway to grant the privilege when precluding
discovery or barring the door to the courthouse is indeed appropriate.
The Hepting I court adopted a second positive approach to the government's claim of state-secrets privilege: it sought to balance the interests of the parties.9 7 Robert M. Chesney has explained it in the
following terms:
The state secrets privilege as it currently stands strikes a balance
among security, justice for individual litigants, and democratic
accountability that is tilted sharply in favor of security, tolerating
almost no risk to that value despite the costs to the competing concerns. This is understandable and appropriate in at least some contexts, but where the legality of government conduct is itself at issue,
it may be appropriate to explore other solutions to the secrecy
dilemma.98
The procedures and point of view embraced in Hepting provide such a
solution. Rather than favoring the government's security needs without
evaluation or scrutiny, any privilege received by the government is, thus,
the result of a balanced and searching judicial inquiry that weighs the
public, private, and governmental interests involved.
Though markedly less deferential, the approach taken by the Hepting I court is arguably in line with the Reynolds design. The Reynolds
Court emphasized that "[t]oo much judicial inquiry into the claim of
privilege would force disclosure of the thing the privilege was meant to
94. Hepting I, No. C-06-672 VRW, 2006 WL 1581965, at *1 (N.D. Cal. June 6, 2006).
95. Id. at *3.
96. The government claimed that these classified documents contained information about
"sources and methods" and "intelligence activities." Id. at *1.
97. Id. at *4.
98. See Chesney, State Secrets, supra note 10, at 1314.
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protect, while a complete abandonment of judicial control would lead to
intolerable abuses."9 9 Ex parte, in camera review of classified documents enables a court to prevent abuses-such as calling upon the privilege to protect unconstitutional, governmental programs-by
maintaining judicial control over the government's assertion of the statesecrets privilege, while still protecting against public disclosure of any
national security or military secrets the documents may contain.
Although the Reynolds Court also noted that it would "not go so far
as to say that the court may automatically require a complete disclosure
to the judge before the claim of privilege will be accepted in any
case,"'"' history has shown that the Court may have placed too much
faith in the word of governmental officials. Allowing the judge to take
an involved, probing, and less deferential role in the approval of the
government's claim of privilege also allows the judge-with minimal
threat to national security because only the judge views the purportedly
privileged information-to better ensure that the government is not
abusing the state-secrets privilege and is not proffering false information
to the court.
The Hepting H case tackles the state-secrets privilege in a similar,
nondeferential way. 10 1 The case speaks to the limits of the state-secrets
privilege and to the nature of the judicial role in context of the privilege.
The Hepting H court sought to place limits on the government's assertion of the state-secrets privilege.'0 2 One way in which the court accomplished this goal was by refusing to dismiss the case on the basis of the
privilege prior to the commencement of discovery.l0 3 Because of public
disclosures" ° regarding the surveillance program made by both the government and AT&T, the court was unable to conclude that "merely
maintaining" the action would create a "'reasonable danger' of harming
national security. '"05 The court further noted that "the government...
opened the door for judicial inquiry by publicly confirming and denying
10 6
material information about its monitoring of communication content."
The fact that the defendants had made public disclosures regarding the
99. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 8 (1953).
100. Id. at 10.
101. See Hepting 11, 439 F. Supp. 2d 974 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
102. See id. at 995 ("[It is important to note that even the state secrets privilege has its
limits.").
103. See id. at 994-95.
104. See id. at 991-98. The court noted that AT&T and the government have essentially
disclosed that AT&T assists the government in monitoring communications. See id. at 991-92.
The government additionally admitted the existence of a "terrorist surveillance program" that
operates without warrants. See id. at 992.
105. Id. at 994.
106. Id. at 996.
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program indicated to the court that the "very subject matter"1 °7 underlying Hepting's action was not a state secret. 10 8
Thus, the Northern District of California effectively assessed the
government's claim of state-secrets privilege by conducting a two-step
review. First, the court reviewed classified materials in camera to determine whether the privilege applied and to determine what interests the
claim of privilege implicated. Second, the court analyzed whether the
subject matter of the action was indeed a state secret. In determining
that it was not, the court thus allowed the case to proceed to discovery,
noting that the privilege would be further assessed in light of the facts
that surfaced during the process. 1 9
The court appropriately refused to dismiss the entire case on the
sole basis of the state-secrets privilege,110 remarking that "[t]he compromise between liberty and security remains a difficult one. But dismissing this case at the outset would sacrifice liberty for no apparent
enhancement of security." 1 I The Hepting H case thus makes another
extremely important point relevant to the legal issues deriving from the
War on Terror: the court emphasized the special context underlying
Hepting's allegations against AT&T and the United States-an arguably
illegal, systematic program of warrantless surveillance that intrudes
upon the constitutional rights of individuals." 2 Both the Hepting and
El-Masri cases deal with allegations of grave violations of constitutional
and individual rights. Because the Northern District of California
applied the state-secrets privilege in a way that enabled the Hepting case
to move forward into discovery, the plaintiffs have a chance to vindicate
violations of their constitutional and statutory rights. When the Eastern
District of Virginia and Fourth Circuit dismissed El-Masri's case, however, he was left without a remedy for his injuries in the U.S. court
system, and any constitutional violations committed by the government
went unpunished.
Finally, the Northern District of California in Hepting H adopted an
107. Id. at 993 (citing Kasza v. Browner, 133 F.3d 1159, 1170 (9th Cir. 1998)) (stating that
"[tihe court must... dismiss this case if 'the very subject matter of the action' is a state secret and
therefore 'any further proceeding ... would jeopardize national security.').
108. Id. at 994 ("[Tlhe very subject matter of this action is hardly a secret.").
109. See id. at 994-95.
110. Id. at 1011.
111. Id. at 995.
112. See id. at 978-79. The plaintiffs claimed that AT&T collaborated with the NSA in a
"massive warrantless surveillance program that illegally tracks the domestic and foreign
communications and communication records of millions of Americans." Id. at 978. The plaintiffs
claimed violations of the First and Fourth Amendments and several statutes regulating electronic
surveillance and communications. Id. at 978-79. Likewise, the allegations made in the El-Masri
case also suggest the existence of an illegal governmental program of extraordinary rendition. See
EI-Masri 1, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530, 532-34 (E.D. Va. 2006).
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encouraging stance on the role of the federal courts, noting that "[w]hile
the court recognizes and respects the executive's constitutional duty to
protect the nation from threats, the court also takes seriously its constitutional duty to adjudicate the disputes that come before it.""' 3 Accordingly, the Hepting court remained faithful to the role of the courts to
decide cases and interpret the law, acting as a check against the abuse of
power by a coequal branch. The Northern District of California's
approach to the state-secrets privilege thus not only allowed it to give
credence to the government's need for confidentiality in the realm of
national security without tolerating abuse of the privilege by the Executive, but also demonstrates an attempt to maintain judicial integrity and
to uphold notions of separation of powers.
B.

In re United States

In re United States,114 a 1989 case out of the D.C. Circuit, likewise
adopted a favorable approach to the government's claim of the statesecrets privilege. The wife of a deceased member of the Communist
Party of the United States of America brought suit under the Federal
Tort Claims Act against the United States, alleging injuries to herself
and her husband from intelligence activities conducted by the Federal
Bureau of Investigation from 1950 to 1964.115 At the district court level,
the government filed a motion to dismiss the case on the basis of the
state-secrets privilege,' 1 6 refusing to answer the complaint or participate
in discovery. 1 7 The district court denied the motion and ordered the
government to answer the complaint.' 1 8 The government proceeded to
petition the D.C. Circuit for a writ of mandamus, asking the court to
recognize the applicability of the state-secrets privilege and to order the
district court to dismiss the case. 1 9 The D.C. Circuit characterized the
case as follows:
Through the extraordinary means of a petition for mandamus, the
Government urges us to direct the district court to dismiss the plaintiffs complaint merely on the basis of its unilateral assertion that
privileged information lies at the core of this case, which affects both
the plaintiffs ability to establish her claims and the government's
113. Hepting 11, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 995.
114. 872 F.2d 472 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
115. Id. at 473.
116. Id. at 473-74. The government claimed that "continuation of plaintiff's action [would]
inevitably result in disclosure of information that [would] compromise current foreign intelligence
and counterintelligence investigative activities, [would] reveal confidential sources and methods,
and [would] damage sensitive diplomatic relations with other nations." Id. at 478.
117. Id. at 473.
118. Id. at 474.
119. Id.
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ability to defend itself.' 20
The court accordingly denied the government's petition for mandamus
and affirmed the lower court's decision to allow the case to proceed to
discovery,' 2' disfavoring the outright dismissal of a suit at the behest of
the government. The court remarked that "[d]ismissal of a suit, and the
consequent denial of a forum without giving the plaintiff her day in
court... is indeed draconian. '[D]enial of the forum provided under the
Constitution for the resolution of disputes is a drastic remedy that has
rarely been invoked.' ' 1 22 Rather than dismissing the plaintiffs case
from the start, the district court decided to conduct "an item-by-item
determination" of the applicability of the state-secrets privilege. 123 The
D.C. Circuit thus supported the district court's analysis of the statesecrets privilege and its conclusion that by exercising control over any
sensitive evidence,24 the litigation could proceed without jeopardizing
national security.'
The D.C. Circuit also advocated a limited state-secrets privilege,
arguing that "[b]ecause evidentiary privileges by their very nature hinder
the ascertainment of truth, and may even torpedo it entirely, their exercise should in every instance be limited to their narrowest purpose." 125
This is significant in the context of cases involving the War on Terror
for the government can use the privilege in an attempt to conceal the
truth about the warrantless surveillance and extraordinary rendition programs from the judiciary, Congress, and the public. Finally, like the
Hepting court, the D.C. Circuit considered the validity of the government's claim of privilege, noting that it could not "reasonably determine
merely on the basis of [an] in camera affidavit that evidence of the Government's activities of twenty126to thirty years ago will result in the disclosure of state secrets today."'
Similar to the Hepting case, In re United States constitutes another

nondeferential treatment of the state-secrets privilege that can function
120. Id. at 477.
121. Id. at 474.

122. Id. at 477 (citing Fitzgerald v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 776 F.2d 1236, 1242 (4th Cir. 1985)).
123. Id. at 478. The district court conducted an in camera review of a classified affidavit and
opted to consider and apply the state-secrets privilege on a piecemeal basis for the following
reasons. First, the court held that the "very subject matter" of the litigation was not a state secret.
Id. Instead, the suit challenged the government's conduct and technique with respect to certain
investigations. Second, it decided that it was inappropriate to apply the evidentiary privilege to
the disputed information before the relevancy of that information had been determined. Id. In re
United States thus supplies additional support for the argument that cases involving the state-

secrets privilege--especially cases claiming violations of individual or constitutional rightsshould be permitted to proceed to discovery.
124. Id.

125. Id. at 478-79 (internal quotation marks omitted).
126. Id. at 479.
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as a model for future courts. Eschewing the Executive's unilateral assertion of secrecy, the D.C. Circuit allowed the case to proceed to discovery, indicating disapproval of the premature dismissal of a case on the
basis of an unsubstantiated claim of governmental secrecy. Like Hepting, the court suggested procedural protections to balance competing
interests and accommodate the government's need for discretion, scrutinizing the government's claim of secrecy to ensure that it warrants a
grant of privilege. Significantly, the D.C. Circuit projected an interest in
protecting and preserving the judiciary's search for truth-an interest
that is necessary to the proper functioning of the judiciary.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The issues in dispute in the Hepting and El-Masri cases go to the
heart of American constitutional law and raise concerns about the current administration's esteem for individual rights and constitutional values. The state-secrets privilege has come to play a central role in the
litigation of these and other cases, yet the privilege is burdened with
foundational and constitutional weaknesses. These weaknesses are
amplified in the context of the War on Terror, a controversial executive
undertaking permeated with accusations of misconduct and illegality,
because the state-secrets privilege works not only to undermine notions
of separation of powers and checks and balances, but also acts as an
accomplice to the government's attempts to restrict constitutional and
individual rights for the sake of national security.
The privilege permits, and even enables, the government to make
misrepresentations to the courts and, thus, to wrongfully obstruct litigation and avoid accountability. By allowing for the outright dismissal of
a case, the privilege not only leaves a plaintiff claiming victimization at
the hands of the Executive without a remedy, but it also forecloses public debate and the possibility of forced change. It is, therefore, imperative that the judiciary look at the government's claim of state-secrets
privilege with a critical eye in cases involving allegations of unconstitutional governmental conduct in connection with the War on Terror. At
the same time, however, the legitimate need for national security and the
ability of the Executive to act confidently, effectively, and genuinely in
times of war and crisis indeed deserve respect and accommodation by
the federal courts. As Justice Breyer has explained,
ultimately the courts must determine not only the absolute importance of the security interest, but also, and more importantly, its relative importance, i.e., its importance when examined through the
Constitution's own legal lens-a lens that emphasizes the values that
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a democratic society places upon individual human liberty.'1 7
In line with that point of view, Hepting and In re United States provide
an outline for how future courts can accommodate the needs of the government and balance competing interests without compromising individual liberties and rights. Meredith Fuchs suggests that "[s]ecrecy
becomes a danger when it undermines the very values the government
invokes it to protect: democratic self-government, informed debate,
accountability, and security."1 28 The level of secrecy the state-secrets
privilege affords to the Executive enables the Executive to abuse its
power and erode the values, rights, and protections that define the American system of government and way of life. Such abuse of power
divides the nation and hinders its ability to fight terrorism effectively
because notions of freedom, justice, and open, democratic government
must be observed stringently at home in order for others to struggle to
adopt them abroad.

127. Breyer, supra note 92.
128. See Fuchs, supra note 1, at 176.

